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Wealth inequality has reemerged as a major political issue and may become one of the defining themes of the 2016 presidential election. Progressives claim a broad set of causes for wealth inequality, from tax loopholes favoring the wealthy 
to the decline of private sector unionization. 
recently, a number of high-profile public intellectuals have 
begun to finger an additional culprit—lax antitrust enforcement. 
According to prominent progressives such as nobel econom-
ics laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, former labor 
secretary robert reich, and Oxford economist Anthony Atkin-
son, weak enforcement of the antitrust laws has permitted the 
flourishing of anticompetitive mergers, monopolistic conduct, 
and other exclusionary and collusive behavior, with the effect 
of redistributing wealth upward to corporate shareholders and 
senior executives and away from the less wealthy strata of society. 
this monopoly regressivity claim is increasingly being repeated 
in legal and economic scholarship and in the media.
the monopoly regressivity claim may have considerable 
political appeal, but it is vastly overstated. Although there are 
surely some violations of the antitrust laws that exacerbate 
wealth inequality, the generalization that more antitrust enforce-
ment would lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth 
misunderstands the actual incidence and effects of antitrust 
enforcement. exercises of market power have complex, cross-
cutting effects, some of which may be regressive, but many of 
which may also be progressive or distributively neutral. More 
antitrust is not the answer to wealth inequality.
Daniel a. Crane is associate dean for faculty and research at the University of 
Michigan law School.
Is More AntItrust 
the Answer to 
weAlth InequAlIty?
Market power often serves progressive aims.
✒ By Daniel a. Crane
 
The Monopoly regreSSiviTy ClaiM
there are many good reasons to favor competitive markets, 
and to think that some degree of antitrust enforcement is 
necessary to produce such markets. Competitive markets result 
in innovation, lower prices, and expanded output. this is all 
good and healthy, but it does not necessarily result in greater 
income equality. Suppose a more competitive economy results 
in a 20 percent increase in gross domestic product, with all 
members of society benefiting, but the wealthiest stratum 
obtains a greater per-capita share of the wealth than the lower 
strata. in that case, competition would have resulted in growth 
and gains for everyone, even while it would have increased 
wealth inequality. More competition does not inherently lead 
to greater equality.
indeed, many of the social welfare policy interventions favored 
by progressives are designed to mitigate the inequality-inducing 
effects of competitive markets. Minimum wage laws require employ-
ees to be compensated based on some measure of merit or need 
rather than the value of their marginal contributions as ascer-
tained in competitive labor markets. Unions had to be exempted 
from the operation of the antitrust laws because they replaced 
labor competition with labor cartelization. the entire social 
welfare state is built on the premise that competitive markets 
produce socially undesirable outcomes.
So where does the monopoly regressivity claim come from? 
in the developing world, the claim can frequently be heard from 
proponents of market liberalization. Such groups as the Orga-
nization for economic Cooperation and Development, United 
nations Conference on trade and Development, and the World 
trade Organization argue that the introduction of competition 
law increases the welfare of the poor. And indeed this story 
rings true in markets where productive assets are closely held 
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as product market competition softens. indeed, some empirical 
studies show the opposite—that CeO compensation declines in 
less competitive markets. the intuition explaining this effect 
is that CeO talent may be less valuable to the corporation in a 
monopoly market, where earning high profits may be easier than 
in a more competitive market.
What about shareholders? Certainly, shareholders capture 
some gains from monopoly rents, but that does not necessar-
ily make antitrust violations regressive. Shareholding is widely 
distributed in the United States, with 88 million participants in 
401(k) or similar retirement plans and pensions controlling 16 
percent of domestic corporate equities. So, 
directly or indirectly, many middle-class 
interests are represented among the ranks 
of shareholders.
Proponents of the monopoly regressiv-
ity theory point to studies showing that 
shareholding is disproportionately con-
centrated in the hands of the very wealthy. 
But do shareholders reap a significant por-
tion of the monopoly rents generated by 
the corporation? While they surely obtain 
some of the rents, it is far from clear that 
they reap the lion’s share.
it has long been understood that various interests within the 
firm and outside its borders compete to appropriate any monop-
oly rents generated by the corporation. Monopoly profits often 
do not show up on corporate balance sheets (where they would 
benefit shareholders) because they are eaten up within the firm. A 
standard trope in antitrust law concerns the fat, lazy monopolist 
internally consuming its monopoly profits through sloth and lack 
of incentive. As Judge Learned Hand famously remarked in his 
landmark Alcoa decision, “Many people believe that possession 
of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages 
thrift, and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is 
a narcotic.” Or, as nobel laureate John Hicks remarked, “the best 
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” 
Workers are one of the groups well documented to benefit 
from monopoly power. empirical studies have shown a monopoly 
wage premium for both unionized and non-unionized workers 
across a wide range of industries, and also the tendency for union-
ization to increase with increases in employer market power. Blue 
collar workers are thus able to appropriate some of the monopoly 
rents generated by their employers.
Consistent with this economic literature, labor unions and 
other progressive-leaning groups have sometimes supported 
large corporate mergers that raised serious antitrust questions. 
the Communications Workers of America supported the At&t–
t-Mobile merger that was eventually blocked by the U.S. Justice 
Department and Federal Communications Commission, and 
three airline employee unions supported the controversial (and 
now widely derided) merger of American Airlines and USAir. 
Prominent civil rights organizations have supported such cor-
porate mergers as Comcast–nBC and SiriUS–XM. Whether or 
not those mergers should have been blocked as anticompetitive, 
many organizations ostensibly representing the interests of work-
ers, minorities, and other arguably disadvantaged groups saw 
benefits to their constituencies.
A final straw for the claim that shareholders and CeOs are 
the chief beneficiaries of anticompetitive behavior arises from 
the fact that antitrust law applies to non-corporate actors as 
much as to corporate ones. Many of the “producers” whose 
commercial agreements have been challenged by antitrust 
authorities are not corporate at all, but rather sole proprietors 
or middle-class professionals. For example, in 2014 the Federal 
trade Commission brought an enforcement action against an 
association of music teachers over an association rule prohibit-
ing teachers from soliciting clients from rival teachers. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, music teachers earn 
a squarely middle-class annual income of $66,000. in the last 
two years, the FtC also brought enforcement actions against 
other middle-class professions, including property managers, 
legal support professionals, lighting and sign managers, and 
ice skating coaches.
Another case against middle-class professionals, this one 
brought by the Justice Department, showcases the potential for 
antitrust enforcement to have regressive rather than progressive 
wealth distribution effects. in 2005, the Justice Department 
brought an antitrust challenge against the national Association 
of realtors based on restrictions on the ability of home buyers to 
search for real estate listings over the internet. According to the 
Justice Department, the effect of this restriction was to inflate real-
tor commissions. if that allegation was true, then the enforcement 
action likely had highly regressive effects. the median income of 
realtors is $41,990, and that of home sellers (who typically pay 
commissions) is $97,500. Any rent extraction by realtors would be 
progressive. Further, given the magnitude of existing home sales 
($1.2 trillion annually), the magnitude of this progressive effect 
(and, conversely, the regressive effect of antitrust enforcement) 
could be measured in the billions of dollars.
to be clear, my point is not to condemn the Justice Depart-
ment’s enforcement action for its regressivity. rather, it is to point 
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